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A principal contracts with a productive agent whose production cost
is private information and with an insurer who can insure the princi-
pal against variations in the payment to the agent. The insurer and
the agent can collude in their responses to the principal￿ s contract.
Non-cooperative play of the principal￿ s contract constitutes the outside
option for the colluding parties. In this setup, we characterize the im-
plementable outcomes for the principal. We then identify the optimal
implementable outcome under the assumption that the principal faces
a budget constraint. The optimal outcome provides the principal with
partial insurance: For higher realizations of the production cost, the
budget may not be exhausted even though the principal is not directly
concerned with the unspent portion of the monetary funds.
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In hidden information settings, contracting with an informed player leaves the
uninformed designer of the contract with an uncertain cash ￿ ow. Employing a
third party, who is uninformed but who has access to the capital markets, can
provide insurance against this uncertainty. As an example of this situation,
consider a local government￿ s procurement of a public service, such as, garbage
collection, the construction and maintenance of roads, or the creation of parks
and recreational facilities, from a private contractor. The cost of providing
such a service may be the private information of the contractor. The litera-
ture on adverse selection suggests that the government should respond to the
asymmetric information by designing an incentive contract, which stipulates
varying service and monetary compensation levels for the contractor across
di⁄erent cost realizations. The variation in the monetary dimension of this
contract is problematic for the government if the marginal cost of raising pub-
lic funds is increasing or if the government￿ s budget allocates no more than a
￿xed amount for the public service in question. In this case, the government
can bene￿t from involving an outside ￿nancier.1
In such a scheme, the payo⁄ to the party providing the insurance depends
on the choices of the party providing the actual service. This being the case,
the insurer would like to collude with the productive agent to a⁄ect his choices.
In other words, the insurer would like to create an incentive scheme for the
productive agent apart from the designer￿ s initial contract. In this paper, we
investigate the incentives resulting from this collusion potential. We discuss
how the designer should design the initial contract to account for these collusive
incentives.2
Our model builds on an adverse selection framework, where a principal
designs a contract for two players: a productive agent with private information
on the production cost and an uninformed insurer whose task is to insure
1Similarly, a patient visiting her physician is not perfectly informed about the nature or
monetary cost of the treatment she requires. The patient, or her employer acting on her
behalf, can obtain insurance against variations in healthcare expenses by contracting with
a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO).
2The term ￿collusion￿here does not necessarily point to an illegal activity. In the con-
text of our public service procurement example, the ￿nancier may be a shareholder or a
bondholder of the contractor ￿rm and, therefore, has some legal control over the choices
of management (Lewis and Sappington, 1995 and Martimort, 2006). Similarly, HMOs use
legal ￿nancial incentives to induce primary care physicians to cut the number of referrals to
specialists and medical screening tests (Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor, 2004 and Grumbach
et al., 1998).the principal for the variation in cash-￿ ow.3 This contract determines the
compensation level for each player, a transfer for the agent and a wage for the
insurer, as a function of the production level. In the absence of collusion, the
relationship between the compensation and the production levels is governed
by the incentive compatibility and the individual rationality constraints for
every player. These constraints lay out the outcomes available to the principal
in a collusion free setup. When the players have the capacity to collude in
their responses to the contract, the principal￿ s options in the determination
of the compensation levels are restricted further. This paper explores the
extent to which the principal can link the insurer￿ s wage to the performance
of the productive agent. This leads to the characterization of outcomes that
are feasible under collusion. This characterization is used to determine the
optimal contract for a principal whose monetary transfers are constrained by
budget considerations.
In line with the earlier literature, collusion is modeled here as a side con-
tract between the insurer and the agent. If this collusion were fully e¢ cient,
then the resulting outcome would always be on the Pareto frontier of the col-
luding parties and these players would act as a single composite player from
the principal￿ s perspective. In such a case, ￿nding the incentive constraints
for this composite player would be su¢ cient for characterizing the feasible
outcomes for the principal. However, since the productive agent￿ s private in-
formation is unknown to the insurer, collusion takes place under asymmetric
information. Thus, generally, collusion falls short of achieving full e¢ ciency.
This presents the opportunity for the implementation of outcomes which are
unattainable under fully e¢ cient collusion. The ine¢ ciency in the collusion
process may exhibit itself in two di⁄erent forms, which will be introduced in
the following two paragraphs.
Regardless of whether there is an insurer present, the principal must guar-
antee that the agent is receiving a transfer contingent on the production level
in order to induce production. This transfer not only covers the production
cost of the agent but also leaves him an information rent. As is documented
by the adverse selection literature, for the agent not to overstate his produc-
tion costs, his information rent should be decreasing in the cost level.4 When
there is a collusive insurer present, there are di⁄erent ways for the principal
to deliver this transfer to the agent. For instance, the principal may choose
not to provide any direct incentive to the agent but to delegate this task to
3We use masculine pronouns for the principal as well as the agent, and feminine pronouns
for the insurer.
4See Baron and Myerson (1982) among others.the insurer. Under this strictly hierarchical structure, the principal does not
deliver the information rent to the agent himself, but motivates the insurer to
do so. For the insurer to be willing to leave a larger information rent to the
agent whenever the agent has a low production cost, the insurer￿ s own payo⁄
must also be decreasing in the production cost. From the principal￿ s perspec-
tive, this corresponds to leaving an additional information rent to the insurer
on top of the agent￿ s information rent. Both components of the information
rent are decreasing in the production cost. This phenomenon is referred to as
the double marginalization of information rents.5 Under double marginaliza-
tion, the principal cannot use the insurer￿ s wage to o⁄set the variations in the
agent￿ s transfer.
The fact that hierarchies are prone to double marginalization has been
established in the literature. The current paper complements this ￿nding with
the identi￿cation of a di⁄erent phenomenon in collusive setups. To see the
emergence of this contrasting e⁄ect, suppose that the principal foregoes the
hierarchical structure above and decides to provide direct incentives to the
agent. The insurer still has the opportunity to o⁄er a collusive side contract
to the agent. However, this time the agent has the option of refusing the
collusive o⁄er and responding to the principal￿ s contract non-cooperatively.
This outside option provides the agent with a reservation utility at the collusion
stage. Moreover, since di⁄erent agent types respond to the principal￿ s contract
di⁄erently, this reservation utility can depend on the realized production cost.
If the reservation utility is decreasing in the production cost, some types of
agents may ￿nd it pro￿table to understate their cost to increase restitution
of the forgone outside option, rather than overstating the cost to increase
the compensation for production. A consequence of this incentive reversal
of the agent is that the main concern for the insurer may turn out to be
the deterrence of the understatement of the production cost rather than its
overstatement. This would be consistent with leaving a wage to the insurer
that is increasing in the production cost as opposed to the decreasing wage
under double marginalization. This is the phenomenon we name the counter
marginalization of information rents.
Outlining the linkage between the insurer￿ s wage and the production levels,
and, therefore, the characterization of the feasible outcomes, requires identify-
ing the extent to which the double marginalization and counter marginaliza-
tion can be employed in the principal￿ s contract design. This is demonstrated
in Proposition 1. When the principal faces a budget constraint, he would
5See McAfee and McMillan (1995), and Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein (1995)
for double marginalization in the delegation setup.like the insurer￿ s wage to be negatively correlated with the agent￿ s transfer.6
Therefore, the principal￿ s optimal outcome exhibits counter marginalization of
information rents. This optimal outcome, which is identi￿ed in Propositions
3 and 4, provides the principal with partial insurance: For higher cost realiza-
tions, the budget may not be exhausted even though the principal does not
receive a direct utility from the unspent portion of the monetary funds.
There is a rapidly expanding literature on collusion between multiple agents.
The methodology of modeling collusion as a side contract between asymmetri-
cally informed agents was developed by La⁄ont and Martimort (1997, 2000).7
More recently, Che and Kim (2006a) show that there exists a contract that is
robust to any side contract between the agents and that achieves the optimal
collusion free expected payo⁄ for the principal as long as his preferences are
quasilinear in money. This result does not apply to our analysis, since we do
not impose quasilinearity of the principal￿ s payo⁄. In Section 5, we relate our
characterization result to Che and Kim￿ s (2006a) and to other papers studying
collusion in adverse selection settings.8
In our application with budget constraints, the insurer is valuable since
she can be used to balance the principal￿ s budget even when the agent is sup-
posed to receive a larger payment than the budget. The need for a similar
budget-breaking third party arises in environments where agents exert uncon-
tractible e⁄ort. Transfers to this third party can support ex-post ine¢ cient
punishments for the agents and achieve the ￿rst best solution even when rene-
6Relative performance evaluation schemes and rank order contracts also use negatively
correlated compensation levels for multiple agents. These schemes are considered to be non-
robust to collusion (Che and Yoo, 2001 and Malcomson, 1986). The current paper suggests
a way to reconcile collusion proofness with relative performance measures.
7See also Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) for collusion in second price auctions under negative
externalities, Severinov (2008) for collusion between the producers of substitutable prod-
ucts, Faure-Grimaud, La⁄ont, and Martimort (2003) and Celik (2007) for collusion between
a supervisor and an agent, Quesada (2004) for collusion initiated by an informed party,
Kofman and Lawarree (1993) for collusion when the contract is signed ex-ante (before the
agents are informed), and Baliga and Sjostrom (1998) for collusion in a moral hazard setup.
Ine¢ ciency of collusion can also be sustained by assuming exogenous transaction costs for
colluding parties. See Tirole (1992) for an extensive survey of the literature following this
alternative approach.
8Che and Kim￿ s (2006a) model is expansive enough to cover an arbitrary number of
colluding agents, an arbitrary production technology for the agents and an arbitrary distri-
bution of types, allowing for correlation, as long as some regularity condition is satis￿ed.
However, the contract they identify is optimal only under the assumption of quasilinear
preferences. When this assumption fails, as it does under the budget constraints, we need a
characterization of all the feasible outcomes to identify the optimal outcome. The current
paper derives this characterization result for a limited setup, where there is only one agent
holding private information.gotiation is possible. Baliga and Sjostrom (2007) study the agents￿collusion
with such a third party in the relationship-speci￿c investment and team pro-
duction environments. They show that the possibility of collusion does not
impose any further cost and, therefore, the ￿rst best is still available to the
agents. The main di⁄erence between their moral hazard setup and the adverse
selection setup here is the fact that their budget-breaker is only needed to sup-
port the o⁄the equilibrium path punishments. In contrast, in our application,
the insurer receives or makes non-zero payments depending on the state of the
world. We show that the insurer is still valuable to the principal, but not as
valuable as she would have been without the possibility of collusion.9
Lewis and Sappington (1995) and Martimort (2006, Section 4) use a regu-
lator￿ s and a local government￿ s risk preference to motivate the assumption of
principal￿ s risk aversion. As in the current paper, they argue that a risk neutral
third party would improve the principal￿ s rent extraction. They represent the
principal￿ s risk aversion by a concave utility function in both the production
level and money. In this setup, the principal is fully insured if he receives a
constant ex-post payo⁄ in all states of nature. This is possible if the princi-
pal delegates to the risk neutral third party. We diverge from this approach
by accounting for the principal￿ s need for insurance against variations in the
monetary transfer stream rather than in his ex-post payo⁄.10 We envision a
situation where the agent￿ s production generates consumption value for the
principal but it is not readily convertible to money for its own ￿nance, such
as, garbage collection, public roads, and recreational facilities. The principal
needs the third party because he prefers not to, or cannot, raise the necessary
funds for production himself.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: We present the model
in Section 2. In Section 3, we characterize the outcomes that are feasible under
the threat of collusion. In Section 4, we turn to an application where the total
monetary compensation by the principal is restricted by a budget constraint
and we identify the optimal outcome. In Section 5, we discuss the existing
literature in connection with our results. We conclude in Section 6. The
9In Baliga and Sjostrom￿ s (2007) construction, the existence of messages, which can be
sent to the designer but which are not contractible at the collusion stage, is crucial for
the implementation of the ￿rst best. In our model, the production level will be the only
contractible variable for both the principal￿ s contract and the collusive side contract.
10Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006) also make a distinction between the motives of
minimizing the variance of payment and minimizing the variance of payo⁄ (footnote 24).
They suggest that the former motive may justify gym users￿ preference for monthly or
yearly memberships, which are disadvantageous in expectation given their usage patterns.
Minimizing the variance of payo⁄ would instead favor the price per visit contracts.Appendix contains the proofs and the characterization of the optimal output
levels for a speci￿c parametrization of the application in Section 4.
2 The Model
The focus of this paper is collusion in multiparty interactions. Nevertheless, we
begin our analysis with a bilateral adverse selection setup. This will establish
the basic structure for studying the three player setup and also serve as a
useful benchmark. We then introduce the insurer as an additional player and
formalize the collusion procedure.
2.1 The Bilateral Setup
The principal (P) is the residual claimant of a good produced by the agent
(A). The constant unit cost of production (￿) is observed by A, but unknown
to P. We also refer to the variable ￿ as the type of A. The variable ￿ is contin-




, where 0 < ￿ < ￿. This distribution is
governed by the cumulative distribution function F (￿) with a probability den-
sity function f (￿). There exists ￿ > 0 such that f (￿) ￿ ￿ for all ￿. To impose













to be well de￿ned and non-negative for all ￿.11
To induce A￿ s production, P commits to a transfer schedule T (￿) that
maps output levels to monetary transfers from P.12 A￿ s utility is quasilinear in
this monetary transfer, i.e., it can be expressed as T (x) ￿ ￿x, where x is the
output level and ￿ is A￿ s type. P￿ s preferences are de￿ned over the output and
transfer levels, and the type of the agent. These preferences are represented
by the payo⁄ function P (x;T;￿). In most applications in the literature, it is
assumed that P￿ s payo⁄ is quasilinear in money. In the current speci￿cation,
the quasilinear payo⁄is a special case such that P (x;T;￿) = p(x;￿)￿T. For
the ￿rst part of the paper, where the focus is on the characterization of the
feasible outcomes, P￿ s preferences will not be relevant. For the application







negative. The additional requirement is commonplace in the literature on type dependent
reservation utility.
12The only contractible variable is the output level and P is restricted to a tari⁄ rather
than a more complex mechanism making use of messages. In the bilateral case, this restric-
tion does not in￿ ict a cost on P.in Section 4, where the optimal outcome is identi￿ed, we assume a particular
functional form for P￿ s utility.
After observing the transfer schedule T (￿), A chooses the output level that
maximizes his utility conditional on his type. This decision induces an output
pro￿le x(￿) and a transfer pro￿le t(￿), both of which are functions of the
type of A.
De￿nition 1 The output - transfer pro￿le fx(￿);t(￿)g is incentive compat-
ible (through T (￿)) if there exists a transfer schedule T (￿) such that
x(￿) 2 argmax
x fT (x) ￿ ￿xg,
t(￿) = T (x(￿))





De￿ne u(￿) = t(￿) ￿ ￿x(￿) as the information rent for type ￿. The fol-
lowing ￿rst order and monotonicity conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for
the incentive compatibility constraints:
u(￿2) ￿ u(￿1) = ￿
Z ￿2
￿1





x(￿) is weakly decreasing. (2)
Condition (1) reveals that A￿ s information rent is decreasing (strictly if
x(￿) > 0) in ￿. In the absence of a decreasing information rent schedule, A has
an incentive to overstate ￿, the production cost, to increase his compensation
from P for the production costs he incurs. The information rent schedule
above precludes such a misrepresentation of A￿ s type by making imitation of
higher types less desirable. After integrating by parts, we rewrite condition
(1) as
t(￿2) ￿ t(￿1) =
Z ￿2
￿1





where the term on the right hand side is the Stieltjes integral of ￿ with respect
to the function x(￿). It is clear from this representation that the transfer
pro￿le is decreasing (strictly if x(￿) is not constant) in ￿.
Incentive compatibility outlines the set of output - transfer pro￿les avail-
able to P, conditional on A￿ s consent to participate in production under the
proposed transfer schedule. Securing A￿ s participation requires leaving him
non-negative utility regardless of his type. This is stipulated by the followingindividual rationality constraint:





Since incentive compatibility implies the monotonicity of t(￿) ￿ ￿x(￿), the




, is su¢ cient to
satisfy the other IR(￿) constraints.
P chooses the output - transfer pro￿le that maximizes his expected pay-
o⁄ among the incentive compatible and individually rational pro￿les. This





P (x(￿);t(￿);￿)f (￿)d￿ s.t. (4)














2.2 Collusion with the Insurer
In this section, we introduce the insurer (N) as a third party to the principal
- agent interaction. N does not incur any production cost or enjoy any direct
bene￿t from production. Her ex-post utility is equal to the monetary payment
she receives.14 Nevertheless, P may still deem N useful, since her monetary
payment can be conditioned on the production of A.
In this extended setup, P is the mechanism designer with the commitment
power as in the bilateral setup. A grand contract o⁄ered by P has two com-
ponents: As before, T (￿) is the transfer schedule to A. The new component,
W (￿), is the wage schedule for N. Both schedules are functions of the level
of output produced by A. In order to use the results from optimal control
theory, we assume for the rest of the paper that functions T (￿) and W (￿) are
continuous.
13This representation of the mechanism design problem does not allow P to o⁄er a sto-
chastic mechanism that maps A￿ s type to probability distributions over output and transfer
pairs. However, if P￿ s payo⁄ is concave in output and transfer pairs on the relevant do-
main, as is the case in the application we consider in Section 4, any stochastic mechanism
is dominated by a deterministic mechanism. This is an implication of the linearity of the
agent￿ s payo⁄ in the output level. When the agent￿ s payo⁄ is non-linear, Strausz (2005)
demonstrates that a stochastic mechanism does not need to satisfy the monotonicity of the
expected output levels and, therefore, may be undominated by deterministic mechanisms.
14Risk neutrality of the insurer simpli￿es the analysis signi￿cantly. However, the potential
for insurance exists as long as the principal is not risk neutral and the insurer is not in￿nitely
risk averse in monetary funds.After the introduction of the new player N, there is no change in A￿ s utility
function. He chooses an output level that maximizes his type dependent utility.
In order to compare bilateral contracting and the setup with the insurer, we
assume that P cares only about the total payment he makes, and not about the
allocation of this payment between A and N. Accordingly, P￿ s utility function
is written as P (x;T + W;￿).
As a result of A￿ s optimization, the grand contract fT (￿);W (￿)g yields an
output pro￿le x(￿), a transfer pro￿le t(￿), and a wage pro￿le w(￿), all of
which are functions of ￿. We refer to fx(￿);t(￿);w(￿)g as an outcome.
As before, A￿ s participation in the grand contract is guaranteed by the
IR(￿) constraints. N does not know the type of A, but is informed about
the type distribution. Therefore, N￿ s participation is assured by the following
ex-ante individual rationality constraint:
IR ￿ N :
Z ￿
￿
w(￿)f (￿)d￿ ￿ 0:
This constraint reveals that the expected value of w(￿) is at least 0. Therefore,
existence of the insurer does not help in reducing the expected value of the
total payment P must make to the other players (t(￿) + w(￿)). If P￿ s payo⁄
is a function of the expected level of the total payment but does not depend
on its other distributional characteristics (which is the case with a quasilinear
payo⁄), then the existence of a insurer is not relevant for P￿ s design problem.
In that case, implementing zero wages (W (x) = 0 for all x), i.e., ￿ring the
insurer and interacting with A bilaterally, is optimal. On the other hand, if P￿ s
utility depends on the allocation of the payments in di⁄erent states of nature,
then P can use the wages to the insurer to insure himself against variations in
the transfers to A.
If there were no possibility of collusion between A and N, constraint IR ￿
N would be the only relevant constraint in the determination of w(￿). In
such a collusion free setup, P maximizes his expected payo⁄ subject to A￿ s
incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints and to N￿ s IR￿
N constraint. As is demonstrated shortly, collusion further restricts the set of
available outcomes.
In this environment, making any use of the insurer￿ s existence requires that
her compensation is a⁄ected by A￿ s production level. This relation between the
payo⁄of N and the production choice of A introduces the question of collusion
between these two players. Collusion between the two parties is modeled as
a bilateral contractual relation, where N has full bargaining power. After
P￿ s announcement of the grand contract fT (￿);W (￿)g, N commits to a sidecontract, B (￿), which speci￿es the bribe she pays A as a function of the output
level.15 The timing of the resulting game is as follows.
T0: ￿ is selected by nature and observed by A.
T1: P announces a grand contract fT (￿);W (￿)g to N and A. Each of them
accepts or rejects the grand contract. If both accept, the game proceeds to the
next stage. Otherwise, the game ends without any production or monetary
payment.16
T2: N announces a side contract B (￿) to A. A accepts or rejects the side
contract.17
T3: A chooses x, the level of production. P pays T (x) to A, and W (x) to
N. If A accepted the side contract, N pays B (x) to A.18 If A rejected the side
contract, N does not make him any payment.
If A accepts N￿ s side contract, his output choice is a⁄ected by both the di-
rect transfer he receives from P, and the bribe he receives from N. Accordingly,
the resulting output - transfer pro￿le is
x(￿) 2 argmax
x fT (x) + B (x) ￿ ￿xg,
t(￿) = T (x(￿)) + B (x(￿))




. In this setup, t(￿) is de￿ned as the net transfer to type ￿
agent which includes the bribe he receives from N. Similarly, w(￿) is the net
wage for N; net of the bribe she pays to the type ￿ agent.
15In this paper, the side contract is assumed to be enforceable as is the grand contract.
Martimort (1999), Abdulkadiroglu and Chung (2003), and Khalil and Lawarree (2006) relax
this enforceability assumption.
16Alternatively, we can assume that the transfer schedule T (x) is in e⁄ect even if N rejects
the grand contract. Since N￿ s rejection is an o⁄ equilibrium path event, this alternative
assumption does not change the results .
17Equivalently, N can be restricted to make only non-negative bribe commitments to A.
In this case, A would not have an incentive to reject any such side contract.
18It is important to note our reliance on the indirect tari⁄functions T (￿), W (￿), and B (￿)
when modeling the mechanisms available to the parties, instead of more general contracts
utilizing messages. This restriction does not in￿ ict any cost in bilateral setups, such as the
one studied in the previous section. However, in our collusion setup, where both P and
N design their own contracts for a common agent, communication through messages may
be bene￿cial to the designer of the contract (See Peters, 2001, and Martimort and Stole,
2002 for common agency). For instance, it is conceivable that N changes her beliefs about
A￿ s type after the side contracting stage. These updated beliefs may a⁄ect the message
she would have submitted to P if messages were allowed in a grand contract. Felli (1996)
provides an example to how the principal can manipulate these updated beliefs to eliminate
the entire cost of collusion potential. The current setup bypasses these considerations by
restricting attention to indirect contracts.The pro￿le fx(￿);t(￿)g satis￿es the conditions above only if it is incentive
compatible through T (￿) + B (￿). Conversely, if fx(￿);t(￿)g is incentive com-
patible, for any transfer schedule T (￿), there exists some bribe schedule B (￿)
such that the above conditions are satis￿ed. Therefore, the above conditions
on fx(￿);t(￿)g reduce to the incentive compatibility condition we discussed in
the previous section.
The side contract of N must also provide the incentive for A to collude
with N.19 If A rejects N￿ s collusive o⁄er, he responds noncooperatively to the
grand contract and receives a type dependent utility of maxx fT (x) ￿ ￿xg. To
guarantee A￿ s participation, his ex-post utility from colluding with N must be
greater than this reservation utility for each ￿.
These incentive compatibility and participation constraints outline the
available output - transfer pro￿les for N at the collusion stage. By choos-
ing a side contract, she picks the available pro￿le that maximizes her ex-
pected surplus. Provided that fT (￿);W (￿)g is the grand contract, and N in-
duces fx(￿);t(￿)g through her side contract, her ex-post surplus is T (x(￿))+
W (x(￿)) ￿ t(￿) as a function of ￿. Accordingly, N￿ s side contract selection






T (^ x(￿)) + W (^ x(￿)) ￿ ^ t(￿)
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Participation(￿) : ^ t(￿) ￿ ￿^ x(￿) ￿ max





For fx(￿);t(￿);w(￿)g to be a feasible outcome under the threat of insurer -
agent collusion, x(￿) and t(￿) must constitute a solution to the above problem
and w(￿) must identify the ex-post utility of N, net of the bribe she pays.
De￿nition 2 The outcome fx(￿);t(￿);w(￿)g is collusion feasible20 (through
fT (￿);W (￿)g) if there exists a transfer schedule T (￿) and a wage schedule
W (￿) such that
i) fx(￿);t(￿)g is a solution to (5), (6)





19Any outcome that results from A￿ s rejection of the side contract can also be achieved
by A￿ s acceptance of an expanded side contract that induces A￿ s non-cooperative behavior
as an additional choice for A. Therefore, there is no loss of generality in considering only
the outcomes that result from A￿ s acceptance of the side contract.
20It should be noted that the outcomes de￿ned here are feasible under the possibility of
collusion between N and A. These outcomes need not be renegotiation proof for P and A.Once again, P￿ s mechanism design problem reduces to choosing the col-
lusion feasible and individually rational (for both A and N) outcome that





P (x(￿);t(￿) + w(￿);￿)f (￿)d￿ s.t. (8)
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w(￿)f (￿)d￿ ￿ 0.
As long as the output - transfer pro￿le fx(￿);t(￿)g satis￿es the incentive
compatibility and individual rationality constraints, setting the wage pro￿le
w(￿) uniformly to zero satis￿es the remaining constraints of the problem in
(8). Therefore, it is not possible for P to be worse o⁄with the introduction of
third party insurance. Of course, a more interesting question is whether P is
strictly better o⁄ in the presence of insurance.
The di¢ culty in dealing with the principal￿ s maximization problem in (8)
results from collusion feasibility. This condition demands that any candidate
for a solution to the maximization problem in (8) must induce a solution to
N￿ s maximization problem in (5) as well. In the following section, we show
that the collusion feasibility condition can be simpli￿ed signi￿cantly.
If the output - transfer pro￿le fx(￿);t(￿)g is induced by a collusion feasible
outcome, it follows from the de￿nition of collusion feasibility that fx(￿);t(￿)g
is incentive compatible. This is su¢ cient to identify t(￿) up to a constant,
given any weakly decreasing x(￿). The characterization of the collusion feasible
outcomes is complete with the identi￿cation of a w(￿) that is consistent with
an incentive compatible output - transfer pro￿le. This is the agenda for the
following section.
3 Collusion Feasible Outcomes
Finding the collusion feasible outcomes requires analyzing the side contract se-
lection problem in (5). This problem is di⁄erent from the optimization problem
of a principal contracting with a single agent as in (4) due to the outside op-
tion provided for the agent if he rejects the side contract o⁄er. In the bilateral
setup, the reservation utility of an agent is exogenously set to 0, regardless of
the type of the agent. In contrast, in problem (5), the agent￿ s continuationpayo⁄ from rejecting the contract is maxx fT (x) ￿ ￿xg, which varies by type.
For this reason, the side contract selection process is a design problem with a
type dependent reservation utility. Unlike in the bilateral setup, determination
of the relevant participation constraints of (5) is not immediate. Depending
on how the reservation utility responds to ￿, the participation constraint can
be slack for the highest type ￿ and/or binding for types lower than ￿.
The e⁄ect of the type dependent reservation utility at the collusion stage
can also be observed by examining the incentives that govern A￿ s behavior.
When the reservation utility is uniformly zero, as we have seen in the bilat-
eral setup, A has an incentive to overstate his type in order to increase the
compensation he receives for the production costs. However, type dependent
reservation utility may be a source of an additional incentive that countervails
the original one: If the reservation utility is declining in type, A may prefer to
understate his type in order to increase the restitution for the forgone reserva-
tion utility. The optimal mechanism depends on which of these incentives is
dominant for each type. Mechanism design problems of this particular nature
were introduced by Lewis and Sappington (1989), and studied in detail by
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), and Jullien (2000). Following these stud-
ies, we transform problem (5) into an optimal control program, where x(￿) is
the control variable and t(￿) ￿ ￿x(￿) is the state variable.21 The solution to
this program is identi￿ed by the result below.
Proposition 1 fx(￿);t(￿);w(￿)g is collusion feasible if and only if fx(￿);t(￿)g





that w(￿) satis￿es the ￿rst order condition
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a) ￿ (￿) is weakly increasing,
b) ￿ (￿) assumes values in [0;1],
c) ￿2 +
F(￿2)￿￿(￿2)
f(￿2) ￿ ￿1 +
F(￿1)￿￿(￿1)
f(￿1) if x(￿2) < x(￿1).
The proofs of this proposition, an all other proofs, are relegated to the
Appendix.
Unlike the ￿rst order condition for incentive compatibility (3), the ￿rst
order condition for collusion feasibility (9) does not reveal the rate of change
21Another problem where these techniques have proven to be useful is mechanism design
subject to renegotiation. See the working paper version of Jullien (2000) for an application
regarding renegotiation proofness.in w(￿) as a function of x(￿) alone. The function ￿ (￿) is also relevant for the
identi￿cation of the wage pro￿le. For instance, whenever x(￿) is di⁄erentiable
at ￿, w(￿) is also di⁄erentiable and its derivative is equal to
F(￿)￿￿(￿)
f(￿) x0 (￿).
Note that the wage pro￿le w(￿) does not have to be monotonic as does the
transfer pro￿le t(￿). The rate of change in the wage pro￿le at ￿ has the same
sign as ￿ (￿) ￿ F (￿).
For any weakly decreasing output pro￿le x(￿) and any ￿ (￿) that satis￿es
the conditions in Proposition 1, there exists a transfer pro￿le t(￿) and a wage
pro￿le w(￿) that are collusion feasible together with x(￿). This indicates that
￿ (￿) can be considered as a choice variable for P. Moreover, the selection of
x(￿) and ￿ (￿) describes pro￿les t(￿) and w(￿) up to a constant.
Jullien (2000) interprets ￿ (￿) as the shadow value associated with the
uniform marginal reduction of the reservation utility for all types between
￿ and ￿. In essence, through the selection of function ￿ (￿), the principal
determines the weight of each participation constraint in the insurer￿ s side
contract selection problem (5). To illustrate this point, suppose ￿ (￿) equals
F (￿) for all ￿. In this case, the relevance of the participation constraints in
problem (5) is determined solely by the probability distribution. This situation
arises if N is indi⁄erent to the announced type of A. In other words, by setting
￿ (￿) equal to F (￿), P can implement a wage pro￿le that is constant (possibly
zero) in ￿. This can be considered to be the replication of a bilateral contract
between P and A.
Proposition 1 implies that P can set ￿ (￿) to values other than F (￿) as
well. This suggests that there are implementable outcomes other than the
replications of the bilaterally implementable ones. For instance, by setting ￿ (￿)
smaller than F (￿) for a certain type ￿, P can induce a wage pro￿le w(￿) which is
decreasing at ￿. Following Jullien￿ s interpretation of the shadow values, ￿ (￿) <
F (￿) indicates that the participation constraints for types higher than ￿ have
more weight in N￿ s optimization problem than do the participation constraints
for types lower than ￿. Therefore, the dominant incentive for the type ￿ agent
is to exaggerate the production cost to increase his compensation (as in the
bilateral setup). The agent with type ￿ should be left an information rent to
preclude such a misrepresentation of his type. This is where the speci￿cs of
N￿ s wage pro￿le play an important role. Since N￿ s wage is decreasing in ￿,
she is willing to leave the information rent to A to prevent an overstatement
of the cost. In this case, both the transfer pro￿le for A and the wage pro￿le
for N are decreasing in ￿. From P￿ s perspective, this is equivalent to leaving
an information rent to N in addition to the information rent that is already
left to A, where both components of the information rent are decreasing in ￿.Following the previous literature, we refer to this phenomenon as the double
marginalization of the information rents.
On the other hand, if ￿ (￿) is larger than F (￿), then the wage pro￿le w(￿)
is increasing at ￿. When this happens, the participation constraints for types
lower than ￿ have more weight in N￿ s optimization problem than do the par-
ticipation constraints for types higher than ￿. This indicates the existence of a
type lower than ￿ that has a reservation utility large enough for his participa-
tion constraint to matter. In this case, the countervailing incentive for the type
￿ agent dominates the original incentive: The type ￿ agent must be motivated
not to understate his type. Such an understatement of A￿ s type reduces the
compensation for N since her wage is increasing in ￿. Therefore, she is will-
ing to provide the motivation to prevent A from understating ￿. Notice that,
when ￿ (￿) is larger than F (￿), the transfer and the wage pro￿les are moving
in the opposite direction at ￿. We coin the term counter marginalization of
the information rents to describe this latter situation.
Double marginalization is experienced most intensely when ￿ (￿) = 0 for all
￿. Then, w(￿) decreases in ￿ with the highest possible rate allowed by collusion
feasibility. In this case, the only relevant participation constraint is that of the
highest type ￿ in the side contract selection problem (5). Hence, P does not
need to provide A with a type dependent reservation utility. This corresponds
to a decentralized organizational form, where P delegates to N the authority to
contract with A. The opposite case, where counter marginalization is profound
and the only relevant participation constraint is that of the lowest type ￿, is
represented by ￿ (￿) = 1 for all ￿.
It should be noted that double marginalization and counter marginalization
both relate to the direction and the rate of change of the wage pro￿le but not
to its expected value. When constraint IR￿N is binding in problem (8), any
payment that is made to N is passed on to A in expectation. If P￿ s payo⁄
is assumed to be quasilinear in money, i.e. P (x;T + W;￿) = p(x;￿) ￿ T ￿
W, then the expected value of the wage pro￿le is the only relevant piece of
information for problem (8). In this case, since P is not interested in the
rate of change of the wage pro￿le, neither double marginalization nor counter
marginalization bears any signi￿cance for his payo⁄ maximization. However,
when P￿ s preferences cannot be represented by a quasilinear payo⁄ function,
speci￿cally when P is not indi⁄erent to the variations in the wage pro￿le, then
the principal might ￿nd it optimal to choose a function ￿ (￿) that gives rise to
double marginalization or counter marginalization. For instance, if P desires
to have a negative correlation between the compensation levels he provides for
the other players, then counter marginalization is likely to arise in his optimal
contract. In the following section, we study an environment where the needfor such a negative correlation emerges due to budget considerations.
4 Optimal Outcome under a Budget
In this section, we use Proposition 1 of the previous section to search for the
optimal outcome for an environment characterized by an upper bound on the
total payment that P can make to A and N. Whatever the type of the agent,
the sum of the transfer and the wage levels cannot exceed P￿ s budget, which is
denoted by M. Once this budget constraint is satis￿ed, P￿ s payo⁄is uniquely
determined by the output. We represent these preferences with the following
payo⁄ function:
P (x;T + W;￿) =
￿
p(x) if T + W ￿ M
￿1 otherwise :
The function p(￿) is continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing, concave
and satis￿es properties limx!0 p0 (x) = 1 and limx!1 p0 (x) = 0. The num-
ber ￿1 can be considered a real number small enough to preclude P from
implementing an outcome where the ex-post total payment exceeds M.22
The payo⁄ function above stands in contrast to more common speci￿ca-
tions, where money enters directly into the principal￿ s objective function as
a consumption good with positive marginal utility everywhere.23 However, in
the public good procurement interpretation of our model, this payo⁄ function
may arise naturally: The principal can be thought as (a department of) a local
government whose budget for the public project in question is ￿xed (by the
local legislature) and who is required to relinquish any unspent portion of this
budget. This particular payo⁄ function is useful for our analysis of counter
marginalization since it gives rise to an analytically tractable setup, where
22The principal never chooses to implement an outcome where the total payment level
exceeds M. For lower total payment levels, the principal￿ s payo⁄ does not respond to the
payment level and it is strictly concave in the output level. As discussed in footnote 13,
allowing for stochastic mechanisms would not change the optimal outcome.
23With a considerable algebraic burden, we could impose an inherent disutility from spend-
ing money for the principal in addition to the budget constraints. In that case, the principal￿ s
preferences would be represented by the payo⁄ function
P (x;T + W;￿) =
￿
p(x) ￿ T ￿ W if T + W ￿ M
￿1 otherwise :
If no budget constraint is binding, then the speci￿cation above reduces to the quasilin-
ear speci￿cation. If there is a binding budget constraint, then all the results that follow
qualitatively remain.the principal has an interest in sustaining a negative correlation between the
compensation levels of the parties involved.
Recall that incentive compatibility implies a weakly decreasing transfer
pro￿le for A. If P did not have access to insurance, the budget constraint for
the lowest type (t(￿) ￿ M ) would be su¢ cient to satisfy all the other budget
constraints. In contrast, when the insurer N is present, not only can the
transfer to A vary with A￿ s type, but so can the wage to N. In this case, P can
construct N￿s wage pro￿le to distribute the burden of the budget constraint
over types other than the lowest type. To elucidate this point, we ￿rst consider
the collusion free setup, where N does not have the capacity to collude with
A. Later, we extend the analysis to account for collusion.
4.1 Optimal Outcome in the Collusion Free Setup
In the absence of collusion, the only constraint restricting N￿ s wage is the
ex-ante individual rationality constraint, IR ￿ N, which stipulates that her
expected wage must be non-negative. P can use the variation in N￿ s wage to
distribute the burden of the budget constraint over the states of nature where
A￿ s type is not ￿. As a result, P can design her mechanism for A as though
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t(￿)f (￿)d￿ ￿ M.
The next step involves solving for the transfer pro￿le t(￿) in terms of the
output pro￿le x(￿), and reformulating the problem such that the only choice
variable for P is the output pro￿le.
Proposition 2 If x￿ (￿) is a solution to problem (10) together with t￿ (￿), then
x










x(￿)F (￿)d￿ ￿ M, (12)and x(￿) is weakly decreasing.
When we ignore the monotonicity constraint, the problem above reduces
to an optimization problem with a single constraint. Piecewise maximization











for all ￿, where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier. Given the monotone hazard rate
condition and the concavity of the function p(￿), the output pro￿le character-
ized by the above equation satis￿es the monotonicity constraints as well. The
magnitude of ￿ depends on P￿ s utility function p(￿), the distribution function
F (￿), and the size of the principal￿ s budget M.





￿rst order condition (3) reveal the optimal transfer pro￿le t￿ (￿). Since the
budget is exhausted in every state of nature, the corresponding wage levels
are w￿ (￿) = M ￿ t￿ (￿) for all ￿.
4.2 Optimal Outcome under Collusion
In this section, we study the budget constrained environment under the pos-
sibility of collusion between A and N. In this setup, N￿ s wage pro￿le is con-
strained not only by her ex-ante individual rationality, but also by the collu-
sion feasibility requirement. Unlike in the collusion free setup, P cannot freely
choose the rate of change of the wage pro￿le to o⁄set the variation in the
transfer pro￿le. However, the ￿rst order condition (9) for collusion feasibility
provides some latitude for P in the determination of the rate of change in the
wage pro￿le through the selection of function ￿ (￿). The design problem for P
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w(￿)f (￿)d￿ ￿ 0,




.The collusion feasibility condition constrains the rates of change of the output,
transfer, and wage levels; but it is silent for the ￿xed components of these
variables, which are determined by the remaining constraints.
In what follows, we discuss the wage, output, and transfer pro￿les that
constitute the solution to this problem. We start with a result revealing the
optimal ￿ (￿), and consequently identify the optimal wage pro￿le given the
optimal output and transfer pro￿les.
Proposition 3 If fx￿ (￿);t￿ (￿);w￿ (￿)g is a solution to problem (14), then
w￿ (￿) is derived by the binding budget constraint at type ￿ and the ￿rst or-




F (￿) + f (￿)￿ if ￿ < ￿
￿
1 if ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ , (15)
where ￿





if such a solution exists and as ￿ if there is no solution.24
An example of the optimal transfer and wage pro￿les is depicted in Figure
1. It is not surprising that the budget constraint BB (￿) is binding for the
lowest cost ￿ in the optimal outcome. It follows from condition (3) that the
transfer to A reaches its maximum at this cost level. Also note that P does not
receive any direct utility from the unspent portion of his budget. Therefore, P
tries to use all of his funds to induce production as permitted by the budget
and the collusion feasibility constraints. The ￿rst order conditions (3) and (9)
pin down the total payment by P as
t
￿ (￿) + w
￿ (￿) = t











for cost level ￿. The budget is balanced at ￿ so that t￿ (￿) + w￿ (￿) = M. By
setting ￿￿ (￿) equal to F (￿) + f (￿)￿ for ￿ < ￿
￿, P ensures that the integrand
in (16) is 0. By doing so, he balances the budget for all values of ￿. However,
for ￿ > ￿
￿, F (￿)+f (￿)￿ is larger than 1, which is the upper bound on ￿￿ (￿).
Therefore, for these values of ￿, ￿￿ (￿) is set to 1 in order to come as close
as possible to balancing the budget. The properties of the optimal outcome
regarding the budget constraint are summarized by the following corollary to
Proposition 3.
24To see the uniqueness of ￿
￿, note that the solution to F (￿)+f (￿)￿ = 1 is also a solution
to ￿ +
F(￿)￿1
f(￿) = 0: The monotone hazard rate condition implies that the left hand side of
this second equation is strictly increasing in ￿.Corollary 1 In the optimal outcome, the budget constraint BB (￿) is binding
for ￿ ￿ ￿
￿. In contrast, the budget constraint BB (￿) is slack for ￿ > ￿
￿ as
long as x￿ (￿) < x￿ (￿
￿).
Considering that P has no value for the unspent funds in his budget, it is
rather unexpected that the budget is not always exhausted under the optimal
contract. P must implement variations in the transfer to A in order to separate
di⁄erent agent types.25 Nevertheless, as we have seen in the collusion free
environment, P could have used N￿ s wage to o⁄set these variations and to
balance the budget if there were no possibility of collusion. However, the
threat of collusion between N and A limits the opportunities of insurance for
P. In other words, the optimal contract￿ s failure to balance the budget is an
indication of the designer￿ s concern over collusion.
Even under the possibility of collusion, the existence of the insurer is valu-
able for P because collusion is not Pareto e¢ cient under asymmetric informa-
tion. The coalitional ine¢ ciency is most apparent for cost levels lower than ￿
￿,
where the optimal outcome induces a ￿ at total payment of the amount M from
25See Levaggi (1999) for another example (with a binary type space for the agent) where
a principal fails to balance the budget in the absence of a third party.P. The N - A coalition could have reduced the output level (and, therefore,
the total production cost) without changing his total payment to the coalition
members. If N were informed of the type of A, she would have o⁄ered him
a bribe to encourage him to reduce his production level. Lacking information
on A￿ s type, N is unwilling to make such an o⁄er because reducing the output
level of type ￿ makes it easier for all types higher than ￿ to imitate type ￿.
This would require a higher information rent from N to all of these types in
order to preclude such imitations. In contrast, when the unit production cost
is high (￿ > ￿
￿), the coalitional ine¢ ciency is not large enough to sustain a ￿ at
payment to the coalition. This is the result of the relatively smaller measure
of types higher than ￿ which may consider imitating ￿ following a decline in
the output level.26
At the solution to problem (14), ￿ (￿) is larger (strictly when ￿ < ￿) than
F (￿). Therefore, the optimal outcome exhibits counter marginalization of
the agent￿ s and the insurer￿ s information rents. The optimal wage pro￿le is
weakly increasing in ￿, whereas the incentive compatible transfer pro￿le is
weakly decreasing. This is the only method for the principal to use N￿ s wage
to o⁄set the variations in A￿ s transfer.
After the identi￿cation of the optimal wage pro￿le, we turn our attention







equals 0. This assumption allows us to employ the pointwise
maximization technique used in the collusion free setup.
Proposition 4 Suppose f (￿)￿ < 1. If fx￿ (￿);t￿ (￿);w￿ (￿)g is a solution to
problem (14), then
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5 ￿ M, (18)
and x(￿) is weakly decreasing.
Following the analysis in the collusion free setup, ￿rst we ignore the monotonic-
ity constraint and determine the ￿rst order conditions of the piecewise maxi-
26The magnitude of the distortion from coalitional Pareto e¢ ciency declines in the type
of the agent and vanishes for the least e¢ cient type ￿. This is in contrast with the ￿no
distortion for the most e¢ cient type￿ result under the uniform reservation utility. This




























for ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (19)
where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier. For small values of ￿, the ￿rst order
condition is that of the collusion free case. However, for large values of ￿,
the virtual cost of production depends on the magnitude of the hazard rate
1￿F(￿)
f(￿) as well as its rate of change. The monotone hazard rate condition is
not su¢ cient to rule out the non-monotonicity of the output pro￿le outlined in
(19). The solution to problem (17) may require the bunching of several types
at the same output level to preserve monotonicity as in Guesnerie and La⁄ont
(1984) .





￿rst order condition (3) reveal the optimal transfer pro￿le t￿ (￿). Moreover,
as stipulated by Proposition 3, the optimal wage pro￿le w￿ (￿) is determined
by the binding budget constraint for type ￿ and the ￿rst order condition (9)
where function ￿ (￿) is determined by (15).
In the Appendix, we provide an example of a particular utility function
p(x) and a type distribution F (￿), and solve for the optimal output levels.
We use this example to compare P￿ s expected payo⁄from the optimal outcome
to his bilateral contracting and collusion free payo⁄ levels. The comparison
reveals that the optimal contract under collusion is an improvement over the
bilateral contract even though it does not perform as well as the collusion free
contract.
5 Literature Revisited
In this section, we study some recent developments in the collusion literature
in light of the characterization result in Proposition 1. The models in the
literature surveyed here di⁄er from the current model in many respects such as
the number of the colluders, the productive and informative tasks of colluders,
and the timing of collusion. Therefore, our characterization result cannot be
directly exported to these di⁄erent environments. Nevertheless, the outcomes
shown to be implementable by these papers are analogous (in the setup of the
current paper) to feasible outcomes that re￿ ect certain properties (identi￿ed
in the current paper).
As discussed in the introduction, Che and Kim (2006a) consider a very
general model and construct a grand contract that reproduces the collusionfree payo⁄ for a principal who has quasilinear preferences. Their construction
is based on the idea that the principal sells the ￿rm to the agents. Under the
proposed grand contract, the principal receives a constant ex-post payo⁄ re-
gardless of the state. For this reason, any manipulation of the agents￿behaviors
under collusion does not a⁄ect the principal￿ s payo⁄. Unlike the application of
the previous section, Che and Kim￿ s (2006a) optimal grand contract does not
utilize the manipulation of the outside options of the agents at the side con-
tracting stage. Actually, their optimal outcome can also be implemented by
delegating to an uninformed party and not directly interacting with the agents.
With the notation of the current paper, this optimal outcome corresponds to
an outcome that can be supported by ￿ (￿) = 0 for all ￿.
Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) study collusion between two productive
agents. They examine a stronger version of collusion where the agents are al-
lowed to collude prior to their participation in the mechanism. Given this tim-
ing, the selling the ￿rm mechanism of Che and Kim (2006a) does not achieve
the collusion free payo⁄ since there are states of nature where the agents will
collectively choose not to participate after learning each other￿ s type. In this
setup, Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) construct a grand contract which
outperforms delegation to one of the agents. Under the characterization of the
grand contract, they show that the participation constraints for all types can
be replaced by a single ex-ante participation constraint that requires leaving
A a predetermined expected utility level. Using the notation of the present
paper, this corresponds to outcomes that can be supported by ￿ (￿) = ￿F (￿)
for all ￿, where ￿ 2 [0;1]. In this environment, Mookherjee and Tsumagari
(2004) show that P can reduce the e⁄ect of double marginalization by choosing
￿ larger than 0 and, therefore, improve over delegation (which corresponds to
￿ = 0).
Pavlov (2006) and Che and Kim (2006b) examine the existence of a grand
contract reproducing the collusion free payo⁄ under the stronger notion of
collusion employed by Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004). The environment
they consider is an auction setup where the bidders collude prior to their
participation in the auction.27 They ￿nd conditions for which the collusion
free payo⁄ is attainable to the auctioneer. Unlike in the environment studied
by Che and Kim (2006a), the optimal payo⁄ here cannot be supported by
27Pavlov (2006) considers a single bidding ring consisting of all the bidders who are as-
sumed to be ex-ante symmetric. These bidders can collude on their bids and make side
transfers to each other. Che and Kim (2006b) study possibly asymmetric bidders and pos-
sibly multiple bidding rings, each equipped with the capacity to reallocate the auctioned
object within the ring members. Furthermore, the bidding rings can coordinate the bids
and make side transfers.delegation. Actually, the implementation of the collusion free payo⁄ calls for
the extreme form of counter marginalization, where the only relevant collusion
participation constraint is that of the highest valuation type. This corresponds
to an outcome supported by ￿ (￿) = 1 for all ￿.28
6 Conclusion
Mechanism design theory studies the outcomes available to a principal design-
ing a contract for the other players. The possibility of collusion between these
players complicates the design problem. In this paper the problem investigated
was that of a principal who deals with a productive agent and an insurer with
a deep pocket. In our setup, the principal was able to utilize the services of
the insurer to sustain ine¢ ciencies in the insurer￿ s collusion with the agent.
These ine¢ ciencies feed on the asymmetric information between the colluding
parties.
One well-studied form of coalitional ine¢ ciency in the multi-player de-
sign setting is the double marginalization of the information rents. Double
marginalization is especially observed in strictly hierarchical structures, where
each tier of the hierarchy contracts with only an immediate subordinate. In
the context of our problem, this corresponds to the principal￿ s contracting
with only the insurer and delegating to her the task of motivating the agent￿ s
production. Under double marginalization, the insurer￿ s payo⁄ is increasing
in the information rent that is left to the agent.
In this paper, we focused on an alternative form of coalitional ine¢ ciency,
which we named the counter marginalization of the information rents. Sustain-
ing this second type of ine¢ ciency requires the principal to actively contract
with all the colluding parties and to provide them with an outside option to
collusion. The principal can create an incentive reversal for the agent through
the manipulation of these outside options. When the principal has a budget
constraint and, therefore, wishes to induce negatively correlated compensa-
tions for the colluding parties, we established that his contract should exploit
counter marginalization.
28An earlier example where the collusion participation constraints are relevant only for
the most e¢ cient type is provided by Caillaud and Jehiel (1998). They study collusion
between bidders, each of which su⁄ers a negative externality if some other bidder receives
the auctioned object. They restrict their attention to second price auctions with a reserve
price. The optimal reserve price for the auctioneer induces coalitional ine¢ ciency. See Celik
(2007) for an example of countervailing incentives for an agent colluding with a supervisor
who is partly informed of the agent￿ s productivity.7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We start with a lemma analogous to Theorem 1 of Jullien (2000). We then
use the lemma to prove the necessity and su¢ ciency parts of the proposition.
Lemma 1 Given W (￿) and T (￿), an incentive compatible output - transfer
pro￿le fx(￿);t(￿)g satisfying Participation(￿); for all ￿; is a solution to N￿ s




i) ￿ (￿) is weakly increasing,










is slack), ￿ (￿) ￿ 0 (with




T (x) + W (x) ￿ ￿x ￿










Proof. First we ignore the monotonicity requirement (2) of incentive com-
patibility and later show that it is satis￿ed. After de￿ning u(￿) = t(￿)+￿x(￿),





[T (x(￿)) + W (x(￿)) ￿ ￿x(￿) ￿ u(￿)]f (￿)d￿ s.t.(21)
u
0 (￿) = ￿x(￿) almost every ￿, (22)
u(￿) ￿ max
x fT (x) ￿ ￿xg for all ￿: (23)
This is an optimal control problem with x(￿) as the control variable, u(￿)
as the state variable, and the participation constraints (23) as the state con-
straints. Seierstadt and Sydsaeter (1987) provide the necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for this type of problem in Theorems 3 and 4 of Chapter 5. Their
results imply that (20) is necessary and su¢ cient for maximization, where ￿ (￿)
satis￿es conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) as stated in the lemma.
29Technically, there are output pro￿les that constitute solutions to (5) other than the one
described by (20) for all ￿. However, any such output pro￿le satis￿es (20) almost everywhere,
and, therefore, is essentially equivalent to x(￿) which satis￿es this condition for all ￿.In order to complete the proof, we must show that the solution to (20)
yields a weakly decreasing output pro￿le. If the participation constraint (23)







is non-negative when ￿ is a real number on the interval
[0;1]. Since ￿ +
F(￿)￿￿(￿)
f(￿) is strictly increasing, x(￿) solving (20) is weakly
decreasing for constant ￿. Alternatively, if (23) is binding at ￿, then
x(￿) = ￿u




x fT (x) ￿ ￿xg = x
￿ (￿), (24)
where x￿ (￿) 2 argmaxx fT (x) ￿ ￿xg. Therefore, x(￿) = x￿ (￿) is weakly
decreasing.
￿ Necessity
Suppose fx(￿);t(￿);w(￿)g is collusion feasible. Lemma 1 implies the exis-
tence of a weakly increasing function ￿ (￿), taking values on [0;1]; such that
T (x(￿2)) + W (x(￿2)) ￿ ￿2x(￿2) ￿
F (￿2) ￿ ￿ (￿2)
f (￿2)
x(￿2)
￿ T (x(￿1)) + W (x(￿1)) ￿ ￿2x(￿1) ￿
F (￿2) ￿ ￿ (￿2)
f (￿2)
x(￿1) (25)




. Substitute (7) in the above inequality:
t(￿2) + w(￿2) ￿ ￿2x(￿2) ￿
F (￿2) ￿ ￿ (￿2)
f (￿2)
x(￿2)
￿ t(￿1) + w(￿1) ￿ ￿2x(￿1) ￿






F (￿2) ￿ ￿ (￿2)
f (￿2)
￿
(x(￿2) ￿ x(￿1)): (27)
Changing the roles of ￿1 and ￿2, and merging the inequalities yield
￿
￿1 +
F (￿1) ￿ ￿ (￿1)
f (￿1)
￿




F (￿2) ￿ ￿ (￿2)
f (￿2)
￿
(x(￿2) ￿ x(￿1)): (29)Since f (￿) is bounded away from 0, ￿ +
F(￿)￿￿(￿)
f(￿) is a bounded function of ￿.
Thus, the total payment t(￿) + w(￿) is absolutely continuous with respect
to the measure generated by x(￿). It follows from the Radon - Nikodym
theorem30 that t(￿) + w(￿) can be written as a Stieltjes integral with respect
to the function x(￿):













. Finally, equation (9) follows from this last equation and
the ￿rst order condition (3). Moreover, the inequalities in (28) and (29) imply
that function ￿ (￿) satis￿es condition (c) stated in the proposition.
￿ Su¢ ciency
We prove su¢ ciency by constructing a grand contract fT (￿);W (￿)g such
that all the participation constraints are binding, x(￿) satis￿es (20), and
W (x(￿)) + T (x(￿)) = w(￿) + t(￿) for all ￿.





supf￿ : x(￿) ￿ xg if x ￿ x(￿)
0 otherwise . (31)
Note that if x(￿) has an inverse, its inverse equals the function de￿ned in
(31) on the relevant domain. The function x￿1 (￿) is weakly decreasing and
continuous except for the countably many output levels where x(￿) is constant.


























￿1 (x)dx and (32)
W (x2) ￿ W (x1) =
Z x2
x1
F (x￿1 (x)) ￿ ￿ (x￿1 (x))
f (x￿1 (x))
dx (33)
for all x1and x2 pairs. Since x￿1 (￿) is weakly decreasing, (32) implies that
T (x) is concave and
x(￿) 2 argmax
x fT (x) ￿ ￿xg
t(￿) ￿ ￿x(￿) = max
x fT (x) ￿ ￿xg




. The last condition ensures that all the participation con-
straints are binding if fx(￿);t(￿)g is a solution to N￿ s maximization problem
(5), so that condition (ii) of Lemma 1 is trivially satis￿ed.
Similarly, condition (c) implies that x￿1 (x) +
F(x￿1(x))￿￿(x￿1(x))
f(x￿1(x)) is weakly
decreasing and T (￿)+ W (￿) is concave. Accordingly, x(￿) satis￿es (20). It
follows from Lemma 1 that fx(￿);t(￿)g is a solution to (5). It is immediate
from the construction of the grand contract fT (￿);W (￿)g and the ￿rst order
conditions (3) and (9) that w(￿) + t(￿) = W (x(￿)) + T (x(￿)) for all ￿.31
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The objective functions in problems (10) and (11) are the same, and they
depend only on the output pro￿le. Therefore, in order to prove the proposition,
it is su¢ cient to show that
i) the constraints of the former problem imply the constraints of the latter,
ii) for any output pro￿le satisfying the constraints of the latter problem,
we can ￿nd a transfer pro￿le satisfying the constraints of the former.
Part (i): The ￿rst order condition (3) for incentive compatibility, integra-





























for all ￿. When we take the expectation of both sides of the inequality and





















31The grand contract fT (￿);W (￿)g is a collusion proof contract, since the resulting trans-
fer and wage levels are the same as the transfer and wage levels that A and N would receive
if there were no opportunity for them to collude.The inequality above and the constraint BB together imply constraint (12).
Monotonicity of the output pro￿le is a requirement of incentive compatibility.
Part (ii): Given a weakly decreasing output pro￿le x(￿) satisfying con-





ing and the ￿rst order condition (3) is satis￿ed. Then, the expected value of
t(￿) satis￿es (35) as an equality. Therefore, it follows from (12) that constraint
BB is also satis￿ed as an equality.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of the proposition follows from the lemmas below. The ￿rst lemma
establishes that the de￿nitions for the optimal ￿ (￿) provided in the statement
of the proposition are indeed identical.
Lemma 2 Suppose ￿





if such a solution exists and as ￿ if there is no such solution.
Then,
minfF (￿) + f (￿)￿;1g =
￿
F (￿) + f (￿)￿ if ￿ < ￿
￿












￿ > 1 at ￿. Therefore, if no solution exists to F (￿) + f (￿)￿ = 1 and
￿
￿ = ￿, it must be that F (￿)+f (￿)￿ > 1 on the relevant domain. Accordingly,




, con￿rming (36). Now suppose a
solution exists to F (￿) + f (￿)￿ = 1. Let us examine the behavior of the
left hand side of this equality for values of ￿ < ￿
￿. The ￿rst term (F (￿)) is
strictly increasing. To check the derivative of the second term (f (￿)￿), ￿rst














= f (￿) + f
0 (￿)￿ ￿ f (￿) ￿
(f (￿))
2






1 ￿ F (￿)
(1 ￿ F (￿) ￿ f (￿)￿): (37)
This yields
d(F (￿) + f (￿)￿)
d￿
> 0 for F (￿) + f (￿)￿ ￿ 1, (38)proving F (￿) + f (￿)￿ passes through the value 1 at ￿
￿ from below and takes
on values larger than 1 for ￿ > ￿
￿, con￿rming (36) again.
Now we show that the optimal wage pro￿le solving (14) is also a solution
to a di⁄erent maximization problem.
Lemma 3 Suppose fx(￿);t(￿);w(￿)g is a solution to problem (14). Then






^ w(￿)f (￿)d￿ s.t. (39)
fx(￿);t(￿); ^ w(￿)g is collusion feasible,





Proof. Since fx(￿);t(￿);w(￿)g is a solution to (14), w(￿) satis￿es the
constraints in (39) together with x(￿) and t(￿). Suppose w(￿) is not a solution
to (39). Then there exists ~ w(￿) such that
fx(￿);t(￿); ~ w(￿)g is collusion feasible,







~ w(￿)f (￿)d￿ =
Z ￿
￿
w(￿)f (￿)d￿ + ￿, where ￿ > 0:
Now consider the outcome
￿
x(￿) + ￿=￿;t(￿) + ￿; ~ w(￿) ￿ ￿
￿
, which is con-
structed by adding or subtracting constant terms to the output, transfer, and
wage pro￿les in the outcome fx(￿);t(￿); ~ w(￿)g. Next, we establish that the
constructed outcome satis￿es the constraints of (14) and gives a higher value
of the objective function.
￿ Collusion feasibility of
￿
x(￿) + ￿=￿;t(￿) + ￿; ~ w(￿) ￿ ￿
￿
follows from
the fact that fx(￿);t(￿); ~ w(￿)g is collusion feasible, and the uniform
shifts on the output, transfer, and wage pro￿les do not a⁄ect the state-




































is satis￿ed for the outcome fx(￿);t(￿);w(￿)g.￿ IR￿N :
R ￿
￿ [~ w(￿) ￿ ￿]f (￿)d￿ ￿ 0 follows from
R ￿
￿ [~ w(￿) ￿ ￿]f (￿)d￿ =
R ￿
￿ ~ w(￿)f (￿)d￿￿￿ =
R ￿
￿ w(￿)f (￿)d￿ ￿ 0, where the last inequality re-
￿ ects the fact that IR￿N is satis￿ed for the outcome fx(￿);t(￿);w(￿)g.





t(￿) + ￿ + ~ w(￿) ￿ ￿ = t(￿) + ~ w(￿) ￿ M, where the last inequality





￿ Finally, the objective function is higher under the output pro￿le x(￿) +








￿ p(x(￿))f (￿)d￿, since function p(￿) is strictly increasing.
Therefore, fx(￿);t(￿);w(￿)g cannot be a solution to (14), unless w(￿) is a
solution to (39).
In light of the previous lemma, to prove the proposition, it su¢ ces to show
that the wage pro￿le w￿ (￿) provided in the statement of the proposition is the
essentially unique solution to (39) given fx￿ (￿);t￿ (￿)g is incentive compatible.





is established in the text (after the statement of Proposition 3).
We prove collusion feasibility by showing that ￿￿ (￿) in (15) satis￿es conditions
(a), (b), and (c) as stated in Proposition 1. Condition (a) follows from (38).
Condition (b) is immediate from the statement of ￿￿ (￿) in the proposition.
For condition (c), notice that ￿ +
F(￿)￿￿￿(￿)




f(￿) otherwise. It follows from the monotone hazard rate assumption
that ￿ +
F(￿)￿￿￿(￿)
f(￿) is weakly increasing for all ￿, proving condition (c).
Since w￿ (￿) satis￿es the constraints in (39), for w￿ (￿) not to be the essen-
tially unique solution to (39), there must exist an alternative pro￿le w￿￿ (￿)
such that
w





￿￿ (￿)g is collusion feasible,
BB (￿) : t
￿ (￿) + w













The last inequality together with the fact that the wage pro￿les w￿ (￿) and






0) > w￿ (￿
0). First, recall that t￿ (￿) + w￿ (￿) equals M for ￿ ￿ ￿
￿.
Therefore, ￿
0 cannot be smaller than or equal to ￿
￿. Otherwise, BB(￿
0) would
fail under w￿￿ (￿). Now suppose ￿
0 is larger than ￿
￿. It follows from the collusion
feasibility of fx￿ (￿);t￿ (￿);w￿￿ (￿)g that there exists a function ￿￿￿ (￿) satisfying
the ￿rst order condition (9) with w￿￿ (￿), as well as conditions (a), (b), and (c)
























￿ (￿) = w
￿ (￿
￿), (40)
where the strict inequality follows from ￿￿￿ (￿) ￿ 1 for all ￿ and w￿￿ (￿
0) >
w￿ (￿
0). This, however, implies that BB(￿
￿) fails under w￿￿ (￿), which consti-
tutes a contradiction to the existence of pro￿le w￿￿ (￿).
7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of Proposition 4 follows similar steps as that of Proposition 2. The
objective functions are the same in problems (14) and (17), and they depend
only on the output pro￿le. Proposition 3 provides the information on the wage
pro￿le solving problem (14). To prove the current proposition, it su¢ ces to
show that
i) any outcome which is a solution to problem (14) satis￿es the constraints
of problem (17),
ii) for any output pro￿le satisfying the constraints of problem (17), there
exists transfer and wage pro￿les satisfying the constraints of (14).
Part (i): Suppose fx￿ (￿);t￿ (￿);w￿ (￿)g is a solution to (14). The con-





fore, fx￿ (￿);t￿ (￿)g satis￿es inequality (34) derived in the proof of Proposition
2. We start by writing (34) for ￿:
t






Once we identify the lower bound on t￿ (￿), constraint BB (￿) reveals the upperbound on w￿ (￿) as
w
￿ (￿) ￿ M ￿ t
￿ (￿)






Now we can write down the wage level in terms of the output pro￿le by using
(9) and the upper bound on w￿ (￿).
w
















































































where the second line follows from integration by parts and the third line from
the absolute continuity of function
F(￿)￿￿￿(￿)
f(￿) given function ￿￿ (￿) described in



























































where the last line follows from integration by parts over the ￿nal term. Re-
calling that (15) implies




￿￿ for ￿ < ￿
￿
F(￿)￿1
















f(￿) for ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ,




￿ (￿)f (￿)d￿ ￿ M ￿
Z ￿￿
￿


















Constraint IR￿N and inequality (45) imply constraint (18). Monotonicity
of the output pro￿le follows from collusion feasibility.
Part (ii): Given a weakly decreasing output pro￿le x(￿) satisfying con-





ing and the ￿rst order condition (3) is satis￿ed. Similarly, de￿ne the wage
pro￿le w(￿) such that BB (￿) is binding and the ￿rst order condition (9) is
satis￿ed with ￿￿ (￿) de￿ned in (15). The resulting total compensation pro￿le
t(￿) + w(￿), which is weakly decreasing, satis￿es all the other budget con-
straints. Moreover, the expected value of w(￿) satis￿es (45) as an equality.Therefore, it follows from (18) that constraint IR ￿ N is also satis￿ed as an
equality.
7.5 The Example
In this part of the paper, we turn to the application with budget constraints.
We introduce an example with a particular utility function for the principal and
a type distribution for the agent. We identify the optimal output pro￿le under
di⁄erent contractual arrangements and then compare the expected payo⁄s
for P under these arrangements. For this example, we assume that the unit






, i.e., F (￿) =
￿ ￿ 1
2 and f (￿) = 1 over the support. P￿ s utility from output is given as
p(x) = lnx. As in Section 4, P cannot spend more than M in any state
of nature. He maximizes his expected utility
R 3=2
1=2 lnx(￿)d￿ subject to the
constraints resulting from the contractual arrangement.
￿ Bilateral Contract
The ￿rst setup studied is a bilateral contract between P and the productive
agent A. Following the discussion of the bilateral setup in Section 2.1, we can




















BB (￿) : t(￿) ￿ M:
Note that constraint BB (￿) is su¢ cient for all the other budget constraints
since incentive compatibility implies a monotonic transfer pro￿le.
The next step is writing down the transfers in terms of the output levels
and substituting them in the objective function. To this end, recall that the




imply inequality (34), which is
derived in the proof of Proposition 2, for type ￿:




Together with BB (￿), this last inequality outlines a condition which must be




x(￿)d￿ ￿ M: (48)





constraint and the ￿rst order condition (3) identify a transfer
pro￿le t(￿) satisfying the constraints of (46) together with x(￿). Therefore,
following the proofs of Propositions 2 and 4, we conclude that the optimal









x(￿)d￿ ￿ M, (50)
and x(￿) is weakly decreasing.
Next, we show that the solution to problem (49) induces complete pooling,
i.e., x(￿) is constant for all ￿. To see this, let x(￿) be a weakly decreasing
output pro￿le satisfying constraint (50). Now we construct the alternative
pro￿le where all types are assigned to the expected value of x(￿) such that
^ x(￿) = ^ x =
R ￿
￿ x(￿)d￿. This constant output pro￿le trivially satis￿es the




^ xd￿ ￿ ￿x(￿) +
Z ￿
￿
x(￿)d￿ ￿ M (51)
since ^ x =
R ￿
￿ x(￿)d￿ ￿ x(￿). Moreover, pro￿le ^ x(￿) induces an improvement
in the objective function since
Z ￿
￿







where the last inequality is strict unless x(￿) is constant. This last step proves
that the optimal output pro￿le is constant.
Now what remains is identifying the constant output level that solves (49).
The objective function is increasing in the level of output. The binding con-
straint (50) reveals this level as M=￿. This output level leaves P with a utility
level of lnM ￿ ln 3
2
￿ = lnM ￿ 0:41 in every state of nature.￿ Grand Contract in a Collusion Free Setup
The second setup we consider is the collusion free setup with the insurer
N. Following the analysis in Section 4.1, the ￿rst order condition revealing the
































d￿ = M, (54)
we identify the value of the Lagrange multiplier as ￿ = 1=M. So the optimal











constraint and the ￿rst
order condition (3) as before. P￿ s budget is exhausted in every state of nature
and, therefore, the wage level is given as w(￿) = M ￿ t(￿) for all ￿. In this








￿ 0:32. In words, with the inclusion of a insurer, the principal can use his
budget as a means of separating the di⁄erent types of the agent, even though
he ends up with the same total payment level in every state of nature. As a
result, he increases his expected payo⁄ above the optimal bilateral contract
payo⁄.
￿ Grand Contract with Collusion
In this setup, P can implement a wage payment to N contingent on the
production level. However, N can collude with A to in￿ uence his output
choice. The analysis of this ￿nal contractual arrangement requires employing
the results derived in Section 4.2. After noticing that ￿
















(4 ￿ 2￿)x(￿)d￿ ￿ M, (57)
and x(￿) is weakly decreasing.
We ￿rst establish that the optimal outcome exhibits pooling of the types
on the interval [3=4;3=2] at the same output level. To see this, let x(￿) be a
weakly decreasing output pro￿le satisfying constraint (57). Now we construct
the alternative pro￿le ^ x(￿) where all types larger than 3=4 are assigned to the
expected value of x(￿) conditional on ￿ > 3=4 and all types lower than 3=4
are left with the original output levels, such that
^ x(￿) =
(




3=4 x(￿)d￿ if ￿ > 3=4
: (58)
The alternative output pro￿le ^ x(￿) is weakly decreasing. After changing the
output pro￿le to ^ x(￿), the change in the value of the left hand side of constraint
(57) can be expressed as
Z 3=2
3=4




= (3=2 ￿ 3=4)[E [4 ￿ 2￿]E [x(￿)] ￿ E [(4 ￿ 2￿)x(￿)]] (59)
where E [￿] stands for the expectation of the argument conditional on ￿ on the
interval [3=4;3=2]. This expression equals ￿(3=2 ￿ 3=4)Cov (4 ￿ 2￿;x(￿)) on
the relevant interval, which is non-positive since both 4 ￿ 2￿ and x(￿) are
weakly decreasing.32 Therefore, constraint (57) is satis￿ed with pro￿le ^ x(￿).
32For a formal derivation, consider
Cov (4 ￿ 2￿;x(￿)) = E [(4 ￿ 2￿ ￿ E [4 ￿ 2￿])(x(￿) ￿ E [x(￿)])]
= ￿2E [(￿ ￿ E [￿])(x(￿) ￿ E [x(￿)])]
= ￿2E [(￿ ￿ E [￿])(x(￿) ￿ x(E [￿]))]
￿2E [(￿ ￿ E [￿])(x(E [￿]) ￿ E [x(￿)])]
= ￿2E [(￿ ￿ E [￿])(x(￿) ￿ x(E [￿]))]:Moreover, ^ x(￿) induces an improvement in the objective function since
Z 3=2
3=4
ln ^ x(￿)d￿ = (3=2 ￿ 3=4)lnE [x(￿)]




where the inequality is strict unless x(￿) is constant on the relevant domain.
This last step proves that the optimal output pro￿le is constant on the interval
[3=4;3=2].
When we impose pooling on types [3=4;3=2], P￿ s optimization problem
reduces to choosing function x(￿) on the interval [1=2;3=4), and choosing xp



















(4 ￿ 2￿)xpd￿ ￿ M, (62)
x(￿) weakly decreasing and x(￿) ￿ xp for all ￿.








for ￿ 2 [1=2;3=4), and
1
xp
















The binding constraint (62) reveals the value of the Lagrange multiplier as
￿ = 1=M. The resulting output pro￿le satis￿es the ignored monotonicity










The budget constraints are binding for ￿ ￿ 3=4, but slack for the other types.
It is optimal for P not to exhaust his budget in every state of nature, even
though money does not directly enter into his utility function. The expected
















d￿ = lnM ￿ 0:34. (65)
As anticipated, this contract yields an expected payo⁄ in-between the two
expected payo⁄ levels discussed earlier.33
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